Washington Law Review
Volume 88
Number 4 Symposium: Contracts in the Real
World
12-1-2013

Unilateral Reordering in the Reel World
Jake Linford

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Jake Linford, Essay, Unilateral Reordering in the Reel World, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1395 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol88/iss4/8

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

12/13/2013 2:14 PM

UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE REEL WORLD
Jake Linford *
INTRODUCTION
Professor Larry Cunningham’s new book, Contracts in the Real
World, 1 demonstrates that there is much to learn about contract law from
a few well-chosen stories. The goal of this Essay is to provide a similar
service, relying on stories gleaned from movies and television—
contracts in the “reel world,” so to speak—to illustrate and then
undermine the traditional stories told about contract formation and
modification. We can learn much from the scenes discussed herein about
how consumers might be led to think contracts are formed, and perhaps
misled about the certainty contracts provide.
Contract law, as it has been classically described, should provide a
stable system for the exchange of property between willing parties, a
concept often referred to as “private ordering.” 2 When stable rules
regarding the enforceability of promises made in arm’s length
transactions are supported by the state, a framework exists in which
parties can have confidence in the deal struck, and plan for the future in
accordance with that deal. Unfortunately, this traditional notion of
private ordering as a bilateral process is, in many cases, mythological.
The reel world—the world of cinema and television—has perpetuated
this idea that contracts are negotiated; that there is a give and take that is
simply not present in the real world, at least for consumer contracts.
Hollywood aside, most contracts are one-sided boilerplate affairs with
terms that consumers can take or leave, but not negotiate or change.
Furthermore, many of these contracts now include unilateral reordering

* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Larry Cunningham and
the editors of the Washington Law Review for this opportunity, to Shawn Bayern, Murat Mungan,
Karen Sandrik, Mark Spottswood, and Franita Tolson for insightful discussions and incisive
comments, and to Evan Liebovitz for excellent research assistance. Remaining mistakes are mine
alone.
1. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012).
2. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE
OF LAW 34 (2013).
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clauses that empower the drafter to change the terms as it sees fit. 3
This boilerplate world is not all bad. Some sellers transact with
hundreds of thousands of consumers—if not millions—in a given year.
Thus, there are situations when it is most efficient to allow sellers to use
fixed terms, which provide for uniform transactions. In addition, fixed
terms that limit liability or otherwise reduce costs may result in savings
that can be passed on to consumers. 4 Nevertheless, there is something
particularly troubling—and I argue inefficient—about a deal that
continually changes.
Part I sets the stage by briefly describing how the representations of
contracting in the reel world generally perpetuate a classical concept of
contract formation. Part II explains some of the differences between
perception and reality, particularly when it comes to boilerplate terms
festooned with unilateral reordering clauses, and offers different
archetypes from the reel world that better reflect modern contract
formation and modification. Part III questions the efficiency rationale
underlying apologies for boilerplate, explains how that rationale is even
weaker when used to justify the enforceability of unilateral reordering
clauses, and proposes solutions stemming from that analysis.
I.

THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
AND MODIFICATION
Negotiation: the essence of capitalism!
—Jack Donaghy, 30 Rock. 5

Contract law, in its classic form, is founded on the concept of a
bargained-for exchange. This classic conception of bargains struck at
arm’s length by parties wringing concessions from one another also led
to a static notion of the contract, one that cannot be modified unless the
party seeking the change gives something in exchange. Many
representations of negotiation in the reel world dovetail with this classic
conception of contract law.

3. In light of the use of unilateral reordering provisions, Curtis Bridgeman and Karen Sandrik
conclude that many promises made by sellers to consumers are “bullshit promises,” allowing the
seller to take advantage of promissory language without being subject to sanctions for changing its
mind. See generally Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379
(2009).
4. See infra Part III.
5. 30 Rock: Hard Ball (NBC Universal television broadcast Feb. 22, 2007).
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Representations of Negotiation in the Reel World

When consumers think about contract negotiations, they might
imagine something like the following scene from Network, a satirical
film about television networks, in which the titular network is trying to
negotiate a deal with a band of radical terrorists (modeled on the
Symbionese Liberation Army) to co-host a program called the Mao-Tse
Tung Hour. 6 Laureen Hobbs is a self-described “bad-ass commie” trying
to control how big a cut the terrorists can take of the program, including
sublicensing fees and distribution costs. Helen Miggs and Willie Stein
represent the network. The Great Ahmed Khan leads the terrorist group,
and Mary Ann Gifford is one of his most ardent devotees. As the
narrator intones, the parties endeavor to work through “the usual
contractual difficulties”:
Helen Miggs: [flipping through her copy of the contract] Have
we settled that sub-licensing thing? We want a clear definition
here. Gross proceeds should consist of all funds the sublicensee
receives, not merely the net amount remitted after payment to
sublicensee or distributor.
Willie Stein: We’re not sitting still for overhead charges as a
cost prior to distribution.
Laureen Hobbs: Don’t fuck with my distribution costs! I’m
getting a lousy two-fifteen per segment, and I’m already
deficiting twenty-five grand a week with Metro. I’m paying
William Morris ten percent off the top! And I’m giving this
turkey [indicates Khan] ten thou a segment, and another five for
this fruitcake [indicates Gifford]. And, Helen, don’t start no shit
with me about a piece again! I’m paying Metro twenty percent
of all foreign and Canadian distribution, and that’s after
recoupment! The Communist Party’s not going to see a nickel
out of this goddamn show until we go into syndication!
Miggs: Come on, Laureen, you’ve got the party in there for
seventy-five hundred a week production expenses.
Hobbs: I’m not giving this pseudo-insurrectionary sectarian a
piece of my show! I’m not giving him script approval! And I
sure as shit ain’t cutting him in on my distribution charges.
Mary Ann Gifford: [screaming] You fuckin’ fascist! Have you
6. NETWORK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976). Those who favor more modern fare might prefer
any of a number of scenes from Entourage featuring the inimitable Ari Gold. See, e.g., Entourage:
Scared Straight (HBO television broadcast Sept. 27, 2009); Entourage: Give a Little Bit (HBO
television broadcast Oct. 4, 2009).
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seen the movies we took at the San Marino jail break-out,
demonstrating the rising up of a seminal prisoner-class
infrastructure?
Hobbs: You can blow the seminal prisoner-class infrastructure
out your ass! I’m not knocking down my goddamn distribution
charges!
[The Great Ahmed Khan fires a pistol into the air.]
Khan: Man, give her the fucking overhead clause! Let’s get
back to page twenty-two, number 5, small ‘a’. “Subsidiary
rights.” 7
In the Network excerpt, parties hold hard lines, drive hard bargains,
use colorful language, and find dramatic ways to punctuate points.
Savvy businessmen and experienced lawyers roll up their sleeves and go
to work until the deal is done. One can imagine nights full of give and
take, crafting the dickered terms to ensure that the parties get a deal that
each side can live with, if not love. But each party can be understood to
get something from the other party—and likely give something up as
well.
There may have been a point in history when this was the typical
manner in which contracts were formed, but those days are long past.8
Most contracts entered into by consumers are one-sided affairs, often
called “contracts of adhesion,” due in part to the stickiness, or
inescapability, of the terms. 9 The terms within are often referred to as
“boilerplate,” because they cannot be changed or negotiated. 10 And
when a consumer tries to understand a modern contract, laden with
boilerplate terms, she might imagine the scene from A Night at the
Opera, 11 where characters played by Groucho and Chico Marx simply
tear from the page those terms they do not understand:
Driftwood: All right. It says the, uh, “The first part of the party

7. NETWORK, supra note 6.
8. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”) (citation omitted).
9. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
10. As Professor Radin has noted:
The term [boilerplate] dates back to the early 1900s and refers to the thick, tough steel sheets
used to build steam boilers. From the 1890s onward, printing plates of text for widespread
reproduction, such as advertisements or syndicated columns, were cast or stamped in
steel . . . . Some companies also sent out press releases as boilerplate so that they had to be
printed as written.
RADIN, supra note 2, at xvi n.* (quoting Wikipedia).
11. A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1935).
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of the first part shall be known in this contract as the first part of
the party of the first part shall be known in this contract”—look,
why should we quarrel about a thing like this? We’ll take it right
out, eh?
Fiorello: Yeah, it’s too long, anyhow. [Both tear off the top part
of their respective contracts] Now, what do we got left?
Driftwood: Well, I got about a foot and a half. Now, it says, uh,
“The party of the second part shall be known in this contract as
the party of the second part.”
Fiorello: Well, I don’t know about that . . . .
Driftwood: Now what’s the matter?
Fiorello: I no like the second party, either.
Driftwood: Well, you should’ve come to the first party. We
didn’t get home ‘til around four in the morning . . . I was blind
for three days!
Fiorello: Hey, look, why can’t the first part of the second party
be the second part of the first party? Then you got something.
Driftwood: Well, look, uh, rather than go through all that again,
what do you say?
Fiorello: Fine. [They rip out another portion of the contract] 12
Of course, there are times when a consumer reads a contract, even in
light of some potentially problematic terms, and signs it anyway. For
example, in The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey, 13 Bilbo Baggins, the
titular hobbit, is presented with a lengthy contract identifying the terms
under which he is to provide services as a burglar. Bilbo takes the time
to read, and eventually sign the contract, even though it includes some
potentially troubling clauses: 14

12. Id.
13. THE HOBBIT: AN UNEXPECTED JOURNEY (New Line Cinema, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Pictures & WingNut Films 2012).
14. The contract also included a unilateral reordering clause: “I, the undersigned, [referred to
hereinafter as Burglar,] agree to travel to the Lonely Mountain, path to be determined by Thorin
Oakenshield, who has a right to alter the course of the journey at his so choosing, without prior
notification and/or liability for accident or injury incurred.” See James Daily, Read a Lawyer’s
Amazingly Detailed Analysis of Bilbo’s Contract in The Hobbit, WIRED.COM (Jan. 17, 2013, 4:17
PM),
http://www.wired.com/underwire/2013/01/hobbit-contract-legal-analysis/.
For
those
unfamiliar with The Hobbit, Thorin Oakenshield is the leader of the dwarves that employ Bilbo
Baggins.
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Bilbo: [reading aloud] The present company shall
not be liable for injuries inflicted by or sustained as a
consequence
thereof,
including,
but
not
limited
to . . . lacerations . . . evisceration . . . incineration? 15
Both Bilbo’s decision to read a contract from start to finish, and the
hard bargaining in a movie like Network, are consistent with a traditional
view of contract formation: parties dicker at arm’s length, carefully
negotiating terms. Under that traditional view, each party gains some
ground and makes some concessions, and each party enters the contract
fully informed about the obligations they have undertaken.
As the excerpts discussed above also demonstrate, the reel world
teaches us that it matters whether things are written down. The parties in
Network were hard at work amending the same type of densely written
contractual language through which Bilbo waded so persistently. But the
certainty of a written contract can be deceptive. There is a perception
that contract formalities and contract language can trip up the unwary. In
It’s the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown, 16 the tripping—or at least the
subsequent fall—is portrayed literally.
You may remember the scene where Lucy tries to entice Charlie
Brown to kick a football she is holding. He is wise to her, and
refuses . . . at first:
Charlie Brown: You just want me to come running up to kick
that ball so you can pull it away and see me land flat on my back
and kill myself.
Lucy: This time you can trust me. See? Here’s a signed
document testifying that I promise not to pull it away.
Charlie Brown: It is signed. It’s a signed document. I guess if
you have a signed document in your possession, you can’t go
wrong. This year, I’m really going to kick that football. [Charlie
Brown runs toward the football, which Lucy pulls away at the
last second] Aaaaahh! [The document goes flying as Charlie
Brown lands flat on his back]
Lucy: [catching the document as it flutters to earth] Peculiar
thing about this document. It was never notarized. 17
The lesson here is two-fold: First, you can go wrong, even with a
signed document in your possession. Second, even a signed document

15. THE HOBBIT: AN UNEXPECTED JOURNEY, supra note 13.
16. Charlie Brown: It’s the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown (Lee Mendelson Film Productions
television broadcast Oct. 27, 1966).
17. Id.
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may not be as enforceable as it appears. While formalities like
notarization are not required to make a contract enforceable (indeed, an
oral contract is enforceable in most circumstances), 18 there is something
comforting about the formalities. With Lucy’s deception of the hapless
Charlie Brown as the deviant outlier, these scenes from the reel world
portray parties committed to getting contract terms right, or at least
understanding them, with the idea that they would be bound to meet the
terms or pay the consequences once the deal was finalized.
Those who have survived a first-year course in contract law know that
there was a time when a formalized, written document bearing a wax
seal was the sine qua non of enforceability. 19 Seals were helpful as a
formality because they performed three key functions. 20 The seal was
formal evidence that the contract exists, or was formed. Heating wax to
apply the seal to a document performed a cautionary function, requiring
the parties to slow down, at least for a moment, and consider whether
they truly wanted to make the commitments embodied in the sealed
document. 21 Finally, the document under seal channels the attention of
the courts and parties after the fact.22 Those commitments made under
seal were thus commitments the parties likely intended a court to
enforce. 23
The power of a seal as a formality was diluted over time, 24 and courts
replaced it with the formality of consideration, also known as a
bargained-for exchange. Contracts are thus enforceable, consistent with
the doctrine of consideration, when the parties have each agreed to the
exchange, with each either giving something up or promising something
to the other party. 25 Thinking back to the example from Network, one
can imagine, if not for lack of time, there would be multiple examples in
the film of the terrorist organization receiving concessions as well as
making them. In the same vein, the problem with Lucy’s promise to
Charlie Brown was not that it lacked notarization, but that it lacked

18. But see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 141–47 (describing cases dealing with the statute of
frauds and the types of contracts that require a writing).
19. Id. at 12–13, 34, 219 n.4.
20. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1941).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 801 (“[F]orm offers . . . [are] channels for the legally effective expression of
intention.”).
24. See, e.g., Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Divine, 116 A. 239 (Conn. 1922) (citing
1 SWIFT’S DIG. 174 (1822 ed.)).
25. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 13; Fuller, supra note 20, at 814–15.
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consideration. 26
Consideration is primarily at issue when a contract is initially formed,
and like the formality of the seal, the formality of consideration
ostensibly performs similar evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling
functions. 27 In a world where bargained-for exchange is the norm, one
expects every contract to be formed in an arm’s length negotiation, and
parties to stick to the deal negotiated. Thus, unsurprisingly,
consideration was seen as an important signal to aid in determining
whether a subsequent agreement to modify a contract was also
enforceable.
B.

Classic Contract Modification in the Real World

As discussed above, contracts are generally enforceable when there is
consideration—mutual benefits received or given by each party.
Contracts can also be modified when the need presents itself. For that
modification to be enforceable, however, courts historically looked for
fresh consideration to support the new terms requested by the party
seeking the modification. 28 In other words, the party subject to the
modified deal should get something in the exchange. Without such
consideration, the newly modified terms were held unenforceable.
Some of the earliest attempts to fix the boundaries of contract
modification are found in two English cases decided at the turn of the
nineteenth century: Harris v. Watson, 29 and Stilk v. Myrick. 30 Harris and
Stilk both dealt with promises made to sailors that the court found
unenforceable. In both cases, the captain of a ship agreed to pay extra
wages to sailors in different exigent circumstances. In Harris, a sailing
ship encountered trouble at sea, and the captain, Watson, promised to

26. There are some general exceptions to the consideration requirement, like the possibility of a
contract formed due to the reasonable reliance of one party on otherwise unenforceable promises by
the other. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 7, 16. Perhaps one could find that poor Chuck
relied to his detriment on Lucy’s promise in a way that makes the promise enforceable. Given their
history, however, it is hard to characterize that reliance as reasonable.
27. See Fuller, supra note 20, at 800; cf. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 103–04
(2000).
28. See, e.g., Thurston v. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 9 (Ohio 1856) (“[A] verbal agreement, to be
effectual and binding as an alteration of the express terms of a prior written contract between the
parties, must be supported by a new and valid consideration.”).
29. (1791) 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (N.P.); 1 P.N.P. 102.
30. (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 851 (N.P.); 6 Esp. 129–30. As discussed, below, two different reports
provided significantly different takes on the rationale supporting the decision in Stilk. See infra
notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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pay five guineas extra if Harris should take on additional navigating
duties. 31 When the ship arrived safely, Harris was not given his extra
pay. 32 Lord Kenyon nonsuited Harris, invoking a maritime policy
against paying extra wages promised in such exigent circumstances.33
Lord Kenyon expressed concern that sailors would “in many cases suffer
a ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand
they might think proper to make.” 34
Leaving aside the believability of a sailor willing to go down with the
ship, rather than do a bit of extra work without extra pay, one can
understand the policy intuitions here. Economic growth in Great Britain
in the eighteenth century depended in large part on transoceanic
commerce. 35 Honoring contracts renegotiated in dangerous
circumstances could encourage negotiating in dangerous circumstances,
and drive up prices for shipped goods, whether or not more ships were
lost at sea as a result of contract disputes gone wrong. There is also some
reason to suppose a captain in such difficult situations might literally say
anything to save his life and his ship, and that contract modifications
entered into in such a circumstance could not be entered into
intentionally or consensually.
In Stilk v. Myrick, 36 two sailors abandoned their ship at the midpoint
in a voyage to Russia. The captain tried and failed to hire two new
crewmen, so he promised to divide their wages among the remaining
men to limp the ship back to London. 37 Stilk was thus distinguishable
from Harris on policy grounds, although Lord Ellenborough did not so
distinguish it. 38 In the more complete of two reports, John Campbell
recounts that Lord Ellenborough based the decision to nonsuit the
sailors’ claim on a lack of consideration between captain and crew for
31. Harris, 170 Eng. Rep. at 94.
32. See id.
33. Id. (citing Hernaman v. Bawden, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1129 (N.P.), 3 Burr. 1844 (holding that
until the ship’s cargo was delivered, wages were not due the sailors, leaving sailors to bear the risk
of loss of cargo); Abernethy v. Landale, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 342 (N.P.), 2 Doug. 539 (same, even
though the plaintiff was not on the ship at the time of capture)); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 27–28 (1974).
34. Harris, 170 Eng. Rep. at 94.
35. See generally Jacob M. Price, What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas
Trade, 1660–1790, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 267 (1989).
36. (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 851 (N.P.); 6 Esp. 129–30.
37. Id.
38. In a report by Isaac Espinasse, id. at 128, Lord Ellenborough is portrayed as persuaded that
Lord Kenyon’s policy analysis in Harris was equally applicable to the case of Stilk. This is
somewhat hard to follow, as there was not the same state of emergency in Stilk as in Harris,
although the captain of the ship in Stilk was admittedly in a tight spot.
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the modification to the deal. 39
In Stilk, consideration was used not to cabin the initial formation of a
contract, but to determine whether or not a subsequent modification to
the contract was enforceable. We also see in Harris, expressly, and Stilk,
less forcefully, stirrings of a general concept of duress.
The more modern case of Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico40
raises some of the same concerns. In Alaska Packers, fishermen hired in
San Francisco threatened, on arrival in Alaska, not to fish during the
salmon spawning season unless they were paid extra wages. The
employer acquiesced, as the hold-out jeopardized its salmon packing
venture for the entire year. The Ninth Circuit held that the modification
was unenforceable, because the work the fishermen promised to do was
within the scope of the initial contract.41 The same principle has applied
in cases where an architect refused to perform until he received a cut of a
competitor’s deal with the client, 42 and when a supplier refused to
provide promised components for radar equipment to a naval contractor
unless the contractor paid extra and used the supplier for its next contract
with the Navy. 43 While there are exceptions to this relatively broad
understanding about the insufficiency of pre-existing duties to provide
consideration for modifications, 44 courts continue to invoke the
principle, 45 to the dismay of some scholars. 46 This classical notion of
contract formation and modification has nevertheless shifted to a
considerable extent, as we consider in the next Part.
39. Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168–69 (N.P.); 2 Camp. N. P. 317–22.
40. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1902); CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 1, at 161–62.
41. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 117 F. at 102 (“Consent to such a demand, under such circumstances,
if given, was, in our opinion, without consideration, for the reason that it was based solely upon the
[fishermen’s] agreement to render the exact services, and none other, that they were already under
contract to render.”).
42. As noted in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co.:
[W]hen a party merely does what he has already obligated himself to do, he cannot demand an
additional compensation therefor; and although, by taking advantage of the necessities of his
adversary, he obtains a promise for more, the law will regard it as nudum pactum [a bare,
unenforceable promise], and will not lend its process to aid in the wrong.
15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1890).
43. See Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 534, 537 (N.Y. 1971).
44. For example, courts have held that the discovery of unforeseen conditions can justify an
enforceable modification, so long as neither party could have anticipated the condition and the
payor agreed to provide extra compensation for the payee’s “extra” work. See, e.g., Brian Constr. &
Dev. Co. v. Brighetti, 176 Conn. 162, 405 A.2d 72 (1978); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 160.
45. See, e.g., Laidman v. Clark, No. 2:11-CV-00704-LRH-PAL, 2013 WL 508169, at *4 (D. Nev.
Feb. 8, 2013).
46. See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 65, 70 (2012).
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UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The classical notion of contract law, and representations thereof from
the reel world, suggest that deals are negotiated, as are modifications.
This notion that parties are empowered to negotiate contracts fits with
other traditional concepts of the common law, such as the notion that
failure to read a contract one has signed is no defense against the
enforceability of the contract.47 That particular notion—about the
importance of reading contracts—opened the door to a new concept of
contract formation: contracts that could be enforceable without
negotiation, even if consumers fail to read the terms at the time of
formation. Sellers (and sophisticated buyers) began to ply contracting
partners with boilerplate agreements, the terms of which are often
unalterable, acontextual, and infrequently read.
As an end result, most consumer contracts are non-negotiable. Terms
may be accepted or rejected, but not shaped by the buyer. There may be
consideration, but it is not bargained for. Consumer contracts governed
by boilerplate terms have become the norm. More recently, this brave
new world of boilerplate terms features a particularly pernicious
specimen: the unilateral reordering clause, which purports to empower
the seller to change the terms at any time, for any reason. 48
The movie excerpts described in Part I are thus more fiction than fact
for a majority of American consumers. In this Part, we consider two
other archetypes. The first comes from the fifth installment of George
Lucas’s Star Wars space opera, The Empire Strikes Back. 49
In The Empire Strikes Back, a handful of heroes—the smuggler Han
Solo; his sidekick, the Wookie Chewbacca; Princess Leia Organa; and
the droid C-3PO—have sought aid from Lando Calrissian, one of Han’s
old acquaintances. Lando is the administrator of a quasi-legal mining
operation. 50 What Han and the others realize too late is that Lando has
47. As one court noted:
To permit a party when sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny that it
expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it
or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.
Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989).
48. See infra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
49. STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980).
50. In one scene, Lando describes his tenuous position:
Lando: So you see, since we’re a small operation, we don’t fall into the, uh, jurisdiction of the
Empire.
Leia: So you’re part of the Mining Guild, then?
Lando: No, not actually. Our operation is small enough not to be noticed. Which is
advantageous for everybody since our customers are anxious to avoid attracting attention to
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already struck a deal, betraying them to Darth Vader, heavy for the
Galactic Empire and the ostensible villain of the piece. As Lando
characterizes it just before the big reveal, the deal with Vader is
designed to “keep the Empire out of here forever.” 51 The initial
negotiation is not fleshed out on screen, but viewers might reasonably
imagine that Vader, as the number two man in the galactic Empire, used
considerable bargaining power to secure certain concessions from
Lando. Nevertheless, one could also imagine a dickered, if somewhat
lopsided, bargain, upon which Lando might reasonably expect to rely.
The viewer learns the rough outline of the deal as it changes over the
last act of the film. First, Lando watches as Vader grants the bounty
hunter, Boba Fett, permission to cart Han off to intergalactic mobster,
Jabba the Hutt. Vader then informs Lando that Leia and Chewbacca
“must never again leave this city.”
Lando: That was never a condition of our agreement, nor was
giving Han to this bounty hunter!
Vader: Perhaps you think you’re being treated unfairly?
Lando: [pauses, then nervously] No.
Vader: Good. It would be unfortunate if I had to leave a
garrison here. [Vader exits]
Lando: [to himself] This deal is getting worse all the time! 52
Unfortunately for Lando, Vader is not yet finished reordering the deal.
After Vader tests a carbon freezing unit on Han, and transfers the
enslabbed smuggler to Boba Fett, he turns to Lando:
Vader: Calrissian, take the princess and the Wookie to my ship.
Lando: You said they’d be left in this city under my
supervision!
Vader: I am altering the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further.53
themselves.
Han: Aren’t you afraid the Empire’s going to find out about this little operation, shut you
down?
Lando: It’s always been a danger that looms like a shadow over everything we’ve built
here . . .
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The comedy program Robot Chicken spliced the two scenes to create the following
running gag:
Darth Vader: Leia and the Wookie must never again leave this city.
Lando Calrissian: That was never a condition of our arrangement, nor was giving Han to this
bounty hunter.
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits]
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While one is left to imagine exact details, it is clear enough that
Lando thought he had a better deal when it was first formed. 54 Lando’s
indignation—assuming it is not feigned—suggests that he understood
the concessions Vader secured from him in the initial negotiation were
the only concessions required to keep his mining colony free of Imperial
entanglements.
These scenes from The Empire Strikes Back, while not directly about
contract negotiation, match modern reality far better than those scenes
presented in Part I. Take for instance the typical credit card agreement.
The card provider typically claims authority pursuant to a unilateral
reordering clause to change the deal as it sees fit after the fact. For
example, in one dispute between Sears and customers who used a Sears
credit card, the court upheld a change in a credit card policy for which
the provider did not directly negotiate. 55 The initial terms agreed to by
consumers included a “Change of Terms” provision which claimed that
Sears “has the right to change any term or part of this agreement,
including the rate of Finance Charge, applicable to current and future
balances.” 56 When the customers signed on, there was no arbitration
Lando: [to self] This deal’s getting worse all the time. [Vader enters]
Vader: Furthermore, I wish you to wear this dress and bonnet. [Presents dress and bonnet to
Lando]
Lando: This was never a condition of our arrangement.
Vader: [interrupts] I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits]
Lando: [to self] This deal’s getting worse all the time. [Vader enters]
Vader: Here is a unicycle. You will ride it wherever you go. [Presents unicycle to Lando]
Lando: What? I’m not riding no [bleep]-ing unicycle. [Throws unicycle to the floor]
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits]
Lando: [to self, aggravated] This deal is getting worse all the time. [Vader enters]
Vader: Also, you are to wear these clown shoes, and refer to yourself as “Mary.” [Presents
clown shoes to Lando]
Lando: [throws clown shoe] Oh, [shoe squeaks] you, man! I’m not doing it!
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits]
Lando: [to self] This deal . . . [pauses and looks around] is very fair and I’m happy to be a part
of it. [Listens for Vader’s entrance. When Vader does not enter, Lando scoops up the dress,
unicycle, and shoes, and exits screen left.]
Robot Chicken: Star Wars Episode II (Stoopid Monkey television broadcast Nov. 16, 2008).
54. One could instead read these scenes as highlighting the high cost of dealing with a corrupt
government, or the lengths to which a businessman will go to circumvent government regulation.
Ilya Somin, for example, has argued that this dialogue highlights the importance of the Contracts
Clause of the Constitution. Ilya Somin, Darth Vader and the Contracts Clause, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/14/darth-vader-and-thecontracts-clause/.
55. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 887–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
56. Id. at 888. This Essay uses the term “unilateral reordering clause” instead of “change of terms
clause” because there are cases where parties negotiate a change in the terms of a contract at arm’s
length, and those changes can be recorded in a “Change of Terms Agreement.” See, e.g., Cranberry
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clause. That soon changed. Sears sent out a letter to inform consumers of
the new terms. While the cover letter did not flag particular changes, a
copy of the new terms included an arbitration clause, requiring “[a]ny
and all claims . . . be resolved . . . by final and binding arbitration before
a single arbitrator.” 57 The court enforced the new agreement, even
though the consumers had not expressly agreed to it, and even though
the services delivered by the credit card provider had not changed. 58 In
other words, the changes were enforced even though there was no
bargaining and no consideration for the modification.
There are cases in which new terms added to a credit card agreement
have been held unenforceable because the agreement is
“unconscionable”—grossly
one-sided
both
procedurally
and
substantively. 59 In many other cases, courts have upheld unilateral
amendments made pursuant to unilateral reordering provisions in the
original agreements against a claim of unconscionability because
consumers have a right to opt out of the deal 60—i.e., to immediately stop
using the credit card rather than accept the change. 61 The decision to
keep using the card, 62 or even the failure to cancel the credit card, 63 has
been taken as evidence of the consumer’s consent to the new terms. In
The Empire Strikes Back, Lord Vader provided an opt-out of a sort to

Fin., L.L.C. v. S & V P’ship, 927 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010); First Citizens Bank v.
Sullivan, 200 P.3d 39, 41 (Mont. 2008).
57. Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 889.
58. Id. at 900.
59. See, e.g., Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299 F. App’x 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2008).
60. See, e.g., Joseph v. M.B.N.A. Am. Bank, N.A., 775 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that an amendment to a credit card agreement adding an arbitration provision was not
unconscionable because plaintiff was given the right to opt out by terminating the agreement and the
arbitration provision was not so one-sided as to be per se unconscionable); Herrington v. Union
Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2000) aff’d sub nom. Herrington v.
Union Planters Bank, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that consumers dissatisfied with a new
arbitration clause “could have simply declined to accept the arbitration provision by terminating
their account before the effective date of the amendment.”).
61. Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 888. Some card providers do not require such an immediate
decision. See, e.g., Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Walker, No. A117770, 2008 WL 4175125, at
*5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. September 11, 2008) (holding an arbitration waiver was not unconscionable
where consumers could refuse the new arbitration clause and continue using the card until its
expiration).
62. Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A.04–507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July
6, 2004) (denying enforcement of a new arbitration term on the ground that it was not contemplated
in the original agreement, but noting that, “[i]f Plaintiffs had used their credit cards, they would
have manifested their assent to the new term, and the change would no longer be unilateral.”).
63. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boomer accepted this offer by
continuing to use AT&T’s services, and therefore the CSA constitutes a contract.”).
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Lando Calrissian, inviting him to modify the contract if he thought he
was “being treated unfairly” and suggesting as part of the price of
“opting out,” that Vader might have to leave a garrison of troops at the
mining colony. 64
Unilateral reordering clauses are not upheld in every case. For
example, one recent case was decided in favor of the consumer on
appeal, but also poses a puzzle. In Douglas v. United States District
Court, 65 Talk America, a cellphone provider, attempted to enforce an
arbitration clause that it unilaterally added to its terms of service. Talk
America had not directly notified customers about the change, but
posted the modified terms on its website. The Ninth Circuit granted a
writ of mandamus, vacating the district court’s decision compelling
arbitration. 66 While the district court apparently assumed that Douglas
must have visited Talk America’s website because he paid his bill
online, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Douglas “would have had no
reason to look at the contract posted there.” 67 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that Douglas was under no obligation to check for new terms,
and had no way of knowing when to check for them. 68 While the court
recognized that assent can be implied in certain cases,69 it concluded that
“such assent can only be inferred after [the consumer] received proper
notice of the proposed changes.” 70 Thus, the new terms were not
enforceable. 71
Douglas is a puzzle not for its holding, but for seller behavior in its
64. For reasons discussed below, courts likely overvalue the protection that an opt-out provides
consumers. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
65. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2007).
66. A writ of mandamus was necessary because the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16
(2012), does not allow interlocutory appeals of a district court order compelling arbitration.
67. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); First
Citizens Bank v. Sullivan, 200 P.3d 39 (Mont. 2008); Cranberry Fin., L.L.C. v. S & V P’ship, 927
N.E.2d 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
70. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066.
71. The court in Douglas also noted the stringent unconscionability standards applied in
California to arbitration clauses. Those standards may no longer be good law. To the extent that
cases like Douglas are tied to the notable resistance of California state courts to unilateral shifts to
arbitration, it is unclear whether those standards would survive direct scrutiny from the Supreme
Court, particularly in light of its recent opinions broadening the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act.
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted a state law barring enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver); see also Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court
Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (2012).
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aftermath. To date, no court has held that changes posted only to a
website provide sufficient notice to consumers. 72 Nevertheless, postDouglas, firms still include unilateral reordering clauses that promise
nothing more than posting the new terms to a website. For example, the
terms of service for cloud computing service Box.com claim the right to
change the terms at any point, promising only to notify consumers “via
the [Box.com] Service and/or by email,” and only if the company
decides that the modification is “material.” 73 As non-material changes
could be posted to the www.box.com website or “related Box blogs,”
customers are “encourage[d]” to “check the date of these Terms
whenever [they] visit the Site to see if these Terms have been
updated.” 74
Box.com is not the only company that persists in claiming that it can
enforce new terms without providing direct notice to consumers. 75 It is
unclear why. Perhaps companies like Box.com have not processed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Douglas, or think that it will not be followed
in other circuits or state courts. 76 Perhaps they have decided to provide
notice of any terms they hope to enforce, and are merely reserving a
right that they will not attempt to exercise. Perhaps firms are becoming
savvier about how to draft unilateral reordering clauses and how to
frame consumer obligations. Firms might instead hope that encouraging

72. Courts have upheld forum selection clauses in contracts between Google and users of its
email services, because “Google requires all users, after seeing a screen listing the terms or a link to
the terms, to agree to the terms of use before creating an email account.” Rudgayzer v. Google Inc.,
No. 13 CV 120(ILG)(RER), 2013 WL 6057988, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013). The court in
Rudgayzer suggested that a unilateral reordering clause in the contract was enforceable, without
discussing how consumers were put on notice of the change. Id. at *2 n.1.
73. Box Terms of Service, BOX.COM, https://app.box.com/legal_text/tos (last updated Feb. 28,
2013).
74. Id.
75. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last
modified Mar. 1, 2012) (“We may modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a
Service to, for example, reflect changes to the law or changes to our Services. You should look at
the terms regularly. We’ll post notice of modifications to these terms on this page.”). Instagram’s
terms of use instead:
Reserve the right, in our sole discretion, to change these Terms of Use (“Updated Terms”)
from time to time. Unless we make a change for legal or administrative reasons, we will
provide reasonable advance notice before the Updated Terms become effective. You agree that
we may notify you of the Updated Terms by posting them on the Service, and that your use of
the Service after the effective date of the Updated Terms (or engaging in such other conduct as
we may reasonably specify) constitutes your agreement to the Updated Terms. Therefore, you
should review these Terms of Use and any Updated Terms before using the Service.
Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM.COM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/# (last modified Jan. 19,
2013).
76. To date, none of the other circuits have cited the case in a reported opinion.
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consumers to regularly check the website will convince courts that
indirect notice is nevertheless sufficient notice. 77 And perhaps
companies take comfort in the fact that many courts and state
legislatures seem more interested in policing the behavior of consumers
than the behavior of credit card companies.78
Considering the behavior of firms like Box.com, the contract-driven
reel world interaction most representative of real world reordering
played out in a recent episode of South Park. 79 The conceit of the
episode is that one of the characters, an elementary student named Kyle,
never reads the updated terms governing his Apple products. In the
process of clicking “yes” to an update, Kyle inadvertently agreed to
undergo a medical experiment. 80 He discovers his error when three
“business casual G-Men” from Apple show up at a local restaurant to
collect him:
Apple Man 1: There he is! [The men approach him] Hello Kyle,
we’re from Apple. We’re all ready for you now. [A second man
sets a scale on the floor]
Kyle: What? Ready for what?
Apple Man 1: To fulfill the agreement. Can we get a weight
please? [The third man puts Kyle on the scale]
Apple Man 2: 83 pounds, sir.
Kyle: What “agreement”?!
Apple Man 1: 83 pounds, good. Let’s get the blood work.
Kyle: Hey! You can’t do that! [The second man pulls out a tape
measure to measure the circumference of Kyle’s head, while the
third man produces a syringe and prepares to take Kyle’s blood]

77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 637–38 (2010) (describing
how some states are engaged in a race to the bottom regarding consumer protections in order to
attract the business of credit card providers); Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do
What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1098, 1128–30
(2010) (same); see also Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001)
(“Delaware’s statutory scheme permitting unilateral amendment with an opt-out is an acceptable
means of amending a credit card agreement.”).
79. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD (Parker-Stone Studios television broadcast April 27, 2011).
It will come as no surprise to the occasional viewer that the New York Times referred to the Comedy
Central animated series as “willfully crude satire.” David Itzkoff, ‘South Park’ at 200: Trey Parker
and Matt Stone Apologize to No One, ARTSBEAT.BLOGS.NYTIMES.COM, (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:30
AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/south-park-at-200-trey-parker-and-matt-stoneapologize-to-no-one/?_r=0.
80. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD, supra note 79. Decency requires sparing the reader further
details about the procedure to which Kyle unwittingly subjected himself.
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Apple Man 1: You agreed we could take all the blood we
needed.
Kyle: What are you talking about?!
Apple Man 1: When you downloaded the last iTunes update, a
window on your screen popped up and asked you if you agreed
to our terms and conditions. You clicked “Agree.” Alright, let’s
get him to the water tank.
Kyle: The water tank? [Steps off the scale and away from the
men] Hey, I’m not going with you!
Apple Man 1: You’ve agreed to all of this! [Kyle runs out of the
restaurant] Hey! 81
Moments later, Kyle seeks help from his friends, who are incredulous
that he never reads the terms and conditions:
Kyle: You gotta help me. These business casual G-men are
trying to kidnap me!
Stan: What?
Kyle: It’s crazy, dude! They’re saying it’s because I agreed to
the latest terms and conditions on iTunes!
Stan: Why? What did the terms and conditions for the last
update say?
Kyle: I don’t know, I didn’t read them!
Butters: You didn’t read them?
Kyle: Who the hell reads that entire thing every time it pops up?
Stan: [earnestly] I do.
Clyde: Me too.
Kyle: You’re telling me that every time you guys download an
update for iTunes, you read the entire terms and conditions?
Jimmy: Of course.
Butters: Well, how do you know if you agree to something if
you don’t read it? 82
There is a level at which the satirists behind South Park are taking a
dig at those who suggest consumers are overburdened and should not be
required to read every online agreement to which they ostensibly
agree. 83 As one of the boys asks, “[h]ow do you know if you agree to

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual
Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.–Feb. 2005, 26, at 26.
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something if you don’t read it?” 84 But even if we assume the average
consumer has the capacity to understand the terms of every boilerplate
contract, she would be hard-pressed to actually read them. Consider a
recent study measuring the privacy policies posted on websites visited
by the public (which are ostensibly enforceable from the moment the
visitor logs on to the website).85 The study determined that the typical
privacy policy on the typical site would take ten minutes to read,86 and
the average American visits approximately 1,462 sites a year. 87 Thus, the
average consumer would need to spend thirty eight-hour days a year—a
full month—reading privacy policies. 88 The authors estimated the
national opportunity costs of reading online privacy policies could reach
$781 billion. 89 That time estimate does not take into account changes to
website terms. If every website changed policies once a year, that could
double the time required. 90
It seems rather unlikely that a court would enforce a term in an iTunes
update that allowed Apple to conduct a medical experiment on its
customers. 91 Reason might suggest that unilateral modification of iTunes
contracts should be limited to things one might expect from iTunes, like
data mining consumers’ music preferences, advertising new MP3s based
on music they have purchased, or making prospective changes to pricing
structures. For example, in Badie v. Bank of America, 92 the court
concluded that a bank could not add an arbitration clause to contracts
with current customers, despite the inclusion of a unilateral reordering
clause in the initial contract, because the initial contract had nothing to
say about arbitration or a right to a jury trial. 93 The court in Badie noted
that “permitting the Bank to exercise its unilateral rights under the

84. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD, supra note 79 (emphasis added).
85. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008).
86. Id. at 554.
87. Id. at 561.
88. See id. at 563.
89. Id. at 564.
90. The study did not account for any terms of service or disclaimers for goods purchased.
91. This is so in part because there is a higher bar to establish informed consent to medical
procedures than in other contexts. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An
Apologia 5 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 640, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255161.
92. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
93. The court in Badie was also persuaded that “the notice contained in the bill stuffer”
announcing the new arbitration clause “was ‘not designed to achieve knowing consent’ to the ADR
provision.” Id. at 290 (quoting the trial court’s conclusion).
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change of terms provision, without any limitation on the substantive
nature of the change permitted, would open the door to a claim that the
agreements are illusory.” 94 Courts in other jurisdictions, however, reject
the Badie rule. For example, in Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 95 an
Illinois Appellate Court held that a unilateral reordering clause means
what it says, and if the contract says anything can change, consumers
should expect—and be bound by—changed language. 96 The reality
highlighted by The Empire Strikes Back and South Park is that most
consumers are at the mercy of the seller, so long as they use the seller’s
products or services, whether or not they realize that the deal has
changed.
III. THE INEFFICIENCY OF UNILATERAL REORDERING
Unilateral reordering clauses would be impossible without a general
acceptance of boilerplate in consumer and business-to-business
transactions. It is hard to imagine, as the Darth Vader excerpt highlights,
one party agreeing in an arm’s length transaction not only to whatever
terms the other party articulates during negotiation, but also to whatever
terms may suit that other party’s needs over the life of the contract, 97 at
least without significant concessions on other terms by the party that
wants the unilateral reordering clause. 98
One of the common defenses of boilerplate on efficiency grounds is
that it leads to lower prices. 99 For example, in his opinion in IFC Credit

94. Id. at 284–85, 297. For more on illusory agreements, which are generally held unenforceable,
see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 150.
95. 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
96. Id. at 900 (“[W]e do not read the ‘change of terms’ provision so narrowly as to preclude an
amendment containing an arbitration provision.”).
97. Based on a conversation with corporate counsel for a Fortune 500 company, when negotiating
deals, boilerplate from the other side often includes a unilateral reordering clause, which the
attorney instructs staff attorneys to strike out if they find it.
98. But see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 636
(2002) (proposing that in exchange for valuable consideration, one could choose to be bound to do
any one thing the other party wrote and sealed in an envelope). In Barnett’s envelope hypothetical,
one could imagine that the writing might require “Do any one thing I specify later.” The reader
could intend to be bound to whatever the writer could later imagine, but the language might just as
likely come as an unpleasant or even unfair surprise.
99. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Terms and
conditions offered by contract reflect private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of
markets.”); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1318–19 (1981) (“Warranty exclusions are a form of product standardization . . . . [I]f the incidence
or magnitude of an element of loss differs greatly between consumers of a product, the market for
insurance may not be sufficiently large to justify offering insurance . . . . [Warranty exclusion thus
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Corp. v. United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Union, 100 Judge
Easterbrook opined that terms in boilerplate contracts that
overwhelmingly favor the seller invariably lead to savings for the buyer:
If buyers prefer juries, then an agreement waiving a jury comes
with a lower price to compensate buyers for the loss—though if
bench trials reduce the cost of litigation, then sellers may be
better off even at the lower price, for they may save more in
legal expenses than they forego in receipts from customers. 101
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical that savings from
boilerplate clauses are passed on to consumers. 102 Professor Margaret
Radin suggests there is insufficient evidence for the traditional argument
that consumers likely benefit to the tune of reduced prices when
companies are allowed to restrict their duties and obligations using
boilerplate. 103 Professor David Horton goes farther, suggesting the
presumption of consumer savings is at its core not falsifiable. 104 In
addition, the cost-saving argument ignores the cost of switching
services, which is often the only opt-out available. When switching costs
are high, firms can retain a greater proportion of a dissatisfied costumer
base without passing on significant savings. 105
As noted above, courts sometimes find unilateral reordering clauses
unconscionable, and thus unenforceable. 106 But this presumption about
pricing can have some problematic effects on standard unconscionability

may reduce] the costs of production and distribution. In this respect, consumers of the product may
be said to have demanded the exclusions.”).
100. 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.). See also id. at 993 (“As long as the market is
competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable; onerous terms just lead to lower
prices.”).
101. Id. at 993. In this way, Judge Easterbrook was simply following in the tracks of the
assumptions articulated by Karl Llewellyn nearly a century ago, regarding the savings that come
from standardized contract language:
[Standardized forms] save trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining. They infinitely
simplify the task of internal administration of a business unit, of keeping tabs on transactions,
of knowing where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfillment, orderly
planning. They ease administration by concentrating the need for discretion and decision in
such personnel as can be trusted to be discreet. This reduces human wear and tear, it cheapens
administration, it serves the ultimate consumer.
K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939).
102. See RADIN, supra note 2, at 100–09.
103. Id. But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 15–16.
104. Horton, supra note 78, at 647 n.274. (“[W]hether a market contains pro-drafter or proadherent terms, the economic model concludes that it reflects adherents’ preferences.”).
105. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (2004).
106. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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tests. For example, in United States v. Bedford Associates, 107 the Second
Circuit articulated three factors to consider when determining whether a
given clause is unconscionable: (1) the benefit of the bargain to the
parties at the time of formation; (2) how the contract was negotiated; and
(3) the relative bargaining power of the parties. 108 If one assumes that
terms unfavorable to consumers lead to a reduction in the price of goods
and services, the first factor will always benefit the seller, because the
benefit to consumers is assumed. Likewise, if one assumes that onesided “negotiations” always save consumers money, then concerns about
actual negotiations are mitigated by the price reduction. Finally, a court
willing to assume that unfavorable terms lead inexorably to favorable
prices will see no need to concern itself with unequal bargaining power.
Whatever its limitations, boilerplate is a fact of life in modern
commercial culture, and it is unlikely to go away. 109 Assuming arguendo
that some of the economic justifications of boilerplate are nonetheless
defensible, unilateral reordering clauses are much less defensible
because they severely exacerbate the inefficiencies of boilerplate. The
problems identified by behavioral economists regarding the challenges
facing consumers who hope to comprehend or comparison shop when
dealing with boilerplate are aggravated by unilateral reordering
provisions. Even worse, there is some indication that the savings realized
by sellers exercising a unilateral reordering provision are rarely, if ever,
passed on to consumers post-formation.
A.

Unilateral Reordering Clauses Worsen Problems with Consent

Boilerplate provisions have been challenged on the ground that
consumers do not actually consent to them in any meaningful way.
Unilateral reordering provisions exacerbate this problem. First, as
described above, consumers could waste an inordinate amount of time
simply trying to read all the boilerplate that suffuses their lives, and thus
often do not bother. 110 Unilateral reordering clauses compound the
workload and further disincentivize reading. Second, unilateral
reordering clauses reduce the effectiveness of consumer notice and even
provide openings for sellers to attempt to evade consumer notice and

107. 657 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982).
108. Id. at 1312–13.
109. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992–93 (7th
Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting that courts almost always find boilerplate provisions
enforceable).
110. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.

12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

12/13/2013 2:14 PM

UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE REEL WORLD

1417

hide potentially objectionable terms.
As a matter of classic contract law doctrine, the party is bound to the
terms of the contract, even if she did not read it. 111 There is some sense
in this. If we want to encourage consumers to read the contracts they
sign (even boilerplate contracts), 112 we would be ill-served to allow
consumers to avoid clauses they did not read. But if a unilateral
reordering clause is construed broadly, as it was in Hutcherson, 113 there
is no aspect of the contract immune to change from day to day. In such
circumstances, it would be fruitless for the consumer to attempt to
educate herself about the nuances of the contract. Thus, the unilateral
reordering clause compounds the difficulty of comprehending the
contract by requiring consumers to invest additional—and potentially
futile—effort to understand every change. Some courts have thus limited
change-of-terms clauses to ideas contemplated or at issue but unresolved
in the original contract. Recall that in Badie v. Bank of America, the
court concluded that a unilateral reordering clause did not empower a
bank to add an arbitration clause to a credit card contract because the
initial contract entered into by consumers did not discuss dispute
resolution at all. 114 Even with such a limiting construction, there is little
benefit in trying to divine which changes a court might consider fair
game and which changes are off-limits as not contemplated in the
original contract.
Some courts assume that a consumer who uses a product or service
after contract terms are updated must be treated as though she consented
to the new terms. 115 Such an assumption seems defensible when the
consumer is sufficiently notified of the change; but as the Douglas case
demonstrates, 116 notice is often insufficient. 117 Even worse, change-ofterms clauses are often held not to be unconscionable because consumers
can opt out of the deal with the seller. In reaching that conclusion, courts
often overlook the costs of consumer lock-in. For example, Oren Bar111. See supra note 47.
112. There is some question whether it ever makes sense to read boilerplate, in light of the
volume of information the typical consumer would need to digest. I leave that question for another
day. But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 9–11.
113. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 900 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003).
114. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see also supra notes 92–94 and
accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boomer accepted this
offer by continuing to use AT&T’s services, and therefore the CSA constitutes a contract.”).
116. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
117. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78, at 1136–37; Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty
Promises, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 989 (2010); Horton, supra note 78, at 649–51, 662.
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Gill has described how difficult it is for the typical consumer to correctly
estimate the cost of switching to a new credit card once a six-month
teaser rate on a credit card gives way to a higher rate. 118 Other scholars
have argued that credit card rates in general are set with one eye to the
risk of providing credit to a particular consumer, and with the other to
the opportunity presented by the “lock-in” effect. 119
There is a second fallacy underlying the assumption that consumer
opt-out cures any distortions created by unilateral reordering. A
unilateral reordering clause is only valuable in contracts where the seller
and buyer will have a business relationship of more than a transitory
duration. 120 Presenting the consumer with an opt-out as the only
corrective for a distorted deal strips away the consumer’s ability to plan
long term in those situations where it is most essential. 121 Shifting risk to
the consumer post-negotiation hampers the ability of the consumer to
plan for and account for risk. Enforcing unilateral reordering clauses
empowers the company claiming the right to change terms and pass risk
on to consumers without negotiating for that right up front, or even
calculating that risk in the initial term. Here, the reel world can help us
understand the disconnect between assumed ease of opt out and the
unfortunate reality of unilateral reordering. Reflect back on the scenes
from The Empire Strikes Back. Lando had an opt-out of a sort, which he
finally exercised when the situation with Vader became intolerable: he
shut down the mining operation, told his clientele to scatter, and shot his
way out of the city with Princess Leia. 122 It is not an outcome Lando
might have embraced when the deal was first negotiated.
B.

Do Unilateral Reordering Clauses Save Consumers Money?
As noted above, lock-in effects generally allow sellers to remain

118. Bar-Gill, supra note 105, at 1407.
119. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit
Cards, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 339, 363–64.
120. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78 at 1125:
The power of the unilateral change-of-terms clause in continuing contractual relationships is in
the dominant party’s ability to exercise the clause when the subordinate party is impotent to
avoid the consequences of its operation. So it is in fact somewhat tautological to acknowledge
the prejudice that operation of the clause entails: prejudice is the point. . . . As long as the
dominant party maintains leverage, it does so precisely because that limited “remedy” is of no
practical use to the subordinate party.
121. See, e.g., Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., St. Unfair Trade Prac. L. (CCH) ¶ 31,169, 2006 WL
6471430 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2006) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, whether in a few
months or several years, the cardholder is left in the same position—either accept the arbitration
clause or forfeit the ability to use a credit card.”).
122. STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 49.
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competitive, even if they pass on significantly less than the total savings
generated by pro-seller contract provisions to consumers. 123 Consumers
have a difficult time properly pricing lock-in effects when change is
flagged up front. 124 It is more difficult when the terms can change with
little advance notice and no limit on scope. 125 Thinking back to the reel
world examples from Part II, Darth Vader’s imperious approach differs
stylistically from Apple’s automatic updates, but they lead to the same
result—unexpected surprises for consumers for which it is difficult to
plan.
There is other evidence that the market for contract terms is typically
not sensitive to reordering by consumers. First, there is some indication
that even sophisticated attorneys tend to incorporate new clauses into
boilerplate without fully understanding their import. 126 Second,
companies may not actually compete on boilerplate terms at all. To the
extent that a clause provides an advantage to a seller (including
managing risk), the rational competitor will incorporate that clause if
they suspect that consumers do not shop based on contract terms. 127
These problems are exacerbated by unilateral reordering. In addition,
boilerplate is often defended against claims regarding consumer consent
and unfair pricing on the ground that sophisticated consumers will reject
terms that are too objectionable, and there are enough sophisticated
consumers to shape business practices. 128 But adding a unilateral
reordering clause to the mix disincentivizes sophisticated consumers and
allows a seller to mitigate the impact of sophisticated consumers on its
business practices.
Even consumers who understand the general import of a unilateral
reordering clause might misapprehend what they give up, especially
when it is difficult to predict how a seller might reorder the contract, and
what that might cost the consumer in the future. 129 The flexibility
provided by a unilateral reordering provision makes it likely that a firm
will include one when drafting boilerplate. Finally, in some jurisdictions,

123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–19.
See supra notes 82–96 and accompanying text.
See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 73–78 (2012).
127. See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF
MARKET CONTRACTS 106, 110 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) [hereinafter BOILERPLATE: MARKET
CONTRACTS].
128. See infra notes 133–35.
129. Horton, supra note 78, at 652.
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some businesses (most often credit card providers) can unilaterally
reorder the contract even without reserving the right to do so in
contractual language. 130 In those jurisdictions, there will be no
competition based on the presence or absence of a unilateral reordering
clause because no clause is necessary.
In addition, a seller exercising a unilateral reordering clause is less
likely to pass savings on to consumers than in the general case, because
the point of a change of terms clause is to shift risk and costs onto the
contracting party once it is detected. 131 Once consumers are locked in,
the seller has a buffer against the need to make future concessions. As
David Horton notes, businesses almost never offer a price reduction to
consumers when the terms change. 132 Even if one assumes that the
product or service consumers purchase was properly priced to reflect the
savings that consumers ostensibly secure through accepting or tolerating
onerous boilerplate terms, the contract is almost never re-priced to
reflect the saving that the seller supposedly passes on to consumers
when it reorders the contract.
Professor Douglas Baird has suggested that despite these typical
concerns, we may not need to worry about contracts of adhesion and
boilerplate, at least so long as there are some sophisticated consumers
that will understand the terms and shop with their feet. 133 The
sophisticated consumer is a false hope for several reasons, and the
problem is once again exacerbated by unilateral reordering clauses. First,
firms have become more adept at dealing with the sophisticated
consumer differently than the general populace. Professor Lucian
Bebchuk and Judge Richard Posner have argued that businesses are less
likely to behave opportunistically than consumers, so the ability to set up
130. Id. at 625 n.132.
131. As noted by Horton:
[T]he absurdity of the “opt out” period comes into sharp relief when one considers that the
adherent would be leaving a company over the existence or non-existence of a procedural term
for another company that enjoys the unfettered power to add, delete, or modify its own
procedural terms. With no way to be sure that the new firm will continue to use the same
procedural provisions in the future, a rational adherent would stay put.
Id. at 650–51.
132. Id. at 651 (noting one exception, Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410,
1413 (M.D. Ala. 1998), where consumers were given the option to accept a unilaterally added
arbitration clause in exchange for a reduction of two percent to the interest rate charged).
133. Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, in BOILERPLATE: MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note
127, at 131, 134. Baird thus acknowledges that in markets which typically lack sophisticated
consumers—like the market for rent-to-own furniture at issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture, Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)—courts should take a more serious look at the
enforceability of the substantive terms of the contract, rather than assume the contract is shaped in
part by the ability of sophisticated consumers to opt out. Id. at 138.
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rigid, business-protective rules in boilerplate language is the most
efficient option because the firm is likely to relax those rules for
consumers who do not behave opportunistically. 134 What Professor
Bebchuk and Judge Posner describe as a benefit becomes a detriment
when one realizes that sellers can use the same bright line to forestall the
claims of the unsophisticated consumer while preserving the flexibility
to treat sophisticated consumers better. A happy sophisticated consumer
is less likely to warn her unsophisticated fellows. Thus, the corporation
can avoid the need to change the terms of the contract by buying off the
sophisticated consumer whose departure might otherwise provide a
warning like the proverbial canary in the coal mine. 135
Another problem posed by relying on the sophisticated consumer is
that even when sophisticated consumers bring problems to the attention
of the public, the public’s collective attention span is unfortunately
short. 136 A seller can play a long game, making substantive shifts in its
favor over time while creating the impression that the company is
conceding on major points. One need only look at the history of privacy
disputes by Facebook users to see this process play out.137 As early as
2006, Facebook began changing its privacy policy in ways that triggered
strong objections from consumers. 138 Facebook responded with
occasional retrenchments and invitations to consumers to adjust privacy
settings, but the combination of Facebook’s nudges towards full
disclosure and its incremental changes in its default settings continually
ratchets down baseline privacy expectations regarding access to user
information. 139 This occurs despite frequent updates by well-informed
134. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, in BOILERPLATE: MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note 127, at 3, 9–10.
135. Sometimes, the company gets rid of difficult consumers instead. See, e.g., Sprint disconnects
customers who complain too much, USA TODAY (July 10, 2007, 7:59 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-07-09-sprint-disconnects-customers_n.htm
(describing how Sprint Nextel cut service for 1,000 consumers who averaged forty to fifty calls per
month to customer service).
136. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Speech and Progress Institutions, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 56–57) (describing the public outcry against recent copyright
reform bills).
137. See generally Robert E. Lemons, Protecting Our Digital Walls: Regulating the Privacy
Policy Changes Made by Social Networking Websites, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 603
(2011); Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/12/business/facebook-privacy.html?_r=0);
Matt McKeon, The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook, http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
138. See e.g., Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Grapples with Privacy Issues, WALL ST. J., May
19, 2010, http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704912004575252723109845.
139. See McKeon, supra note 137.
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users who successfully ferret out every shift in Facebook’s terms of
service. 140
C.

The End of Unilateral Reordering?

What then should be done? The ship has sailed regarding the
enforceability of boilerplate, 141 but in light of the manner in which
unilateral reordering clauses exacerbate problems with consumer
consent and the illusion that products with onerous terms always have
pro-consumer pricing, the correct policy response may be a prophylactic
rule barring any changes enacted pursuant to a unilateral reordering
clause offered in boilerplate language. 142 Such a prophylactic rule is
bound to be over-inclusive. 143 For example, in some cases, wellinformed consumers might legitimately prefer to accept a unilateral
reordering clause. It is also possible that some consumers who fail to
consider, or are incapable of fully processing the import of a unilateral
reordering clause, might nonetheless prefer it to other alternatives
because the lowest price is the only salient factor in the decision
regarding which among competing products to purchase or services to
use. 144 But the harms stemming from allowing unilateral reordering
clauses are sufficiently severe for the majority of consumers specifically,
to markets generally, and to any reasonable theory of contract law, that
the losses from applying a prophylactic rule are far outweighed by the
benefits that will stem from such a rule.
For those skeptical of the prophylactic rule, consider two alternatives:
a “two-price” solution designed to help consumers properly price the
140. See e.g., Steve Henn, Facebook’s Latest Privacy Changes: Tag, You’re You, NPR, (August
30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/30/217281470/facebooks-latestprivacy-changes-tag-youre-you.
141. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992–93 (7th
Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.).
142. As noted by Professors Bar-Gill and Davis, Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board under the Truth in Lending Act, bans creditors from changing terms in a home
equity plan. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5b(f)(3) (2013); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 117, at 31. Other
authors have taken more limited stances against unilateral reordering clauses. Professors Peter Alces
and Michael Greenfield have argued that under traditional contract doctrines, the Uniform
Commercial Code, and certain statutes, some unilateral reordering clauses would be unenforceable.
See generally Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78. Professor Horton supports his call for a bar on the
ability of drafters to unilaterally reorder procedural terms like arbitration clauses by noting that
consumers are unlikely to benefit from the change, or even recognize the importance of new
procedural clauses as changes occur. See Horton, supra note 78, at 652.
143. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 397 (1985) (describing the
over- and under-inclusiveness of the rule-like definition of commercial speech).
144. Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 11.
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unilateral reordering option at the time of purchase, 145 and a “perceived
value” proposal designed to ensure that sellers are passing some savings
on to consumers when exercising a unilateral reordering clause. 146 As for
the first, Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis argue that the
unilateral reordering problem can be corrected by inserting a third party
into the contract, one that will determine whether any given attempted
reordering is enforceable. 147 These third-party “Change Approval
Boards” could market themselves based on how strictly they construe
unilateral reordering clauses.
In a way, Professors Bar-Gill and Davis have suggested a complicated
means of ensuring a level of transparent pricing. Thus, a simpler solution
presents itself: require the seller who offers its goods or services subject
to a unilateral reordering clause to also offer the same goods or services
without such a clause. The goods or services sold subject to seller
reordering are likely to be cheaper than those sold under less alterable
deals. This two-price solution would be similar to other circumstances
where consumers can purchase what are ostensibly the same goods or
services, but with different contract terms and therefore different price
points. For example, Professor Omri Ben-Shahar has recently reminded
us that more people buy nonrefundable, economy-priced airline tickets
than more flexible first-class or business-class tickets, trading flexibility
for price. 148 The difference in price is transparent, at least on some
websites, where the economy class ticket is often steeply discounted
compared to first-class or flexible tickets. 149 Like the difference between
economy and business class airline tickets, a two-price solution to the
unilateral reordering problem would be a minor improvement compared
to the status quo because it would require purveyors of unilateral
reordering terms to transparently price the difference.
The downside of the two-price solution is readily apparent. The
requirement would likely increase costs for sellers, because it would lead
to non-uniform treatment of consumers purchasing the same products
and services. Those costs will almost certainly be passed on to

145. See infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 152–60 and accompanying text.
147. Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 117, at 991.
148. Some have argued that first and business-class tickets were historically over-priced, due to a
lack of sensitivity to price on the part of business travelers in the 1980s. See, e.g., Jon Bonné, Inside
NEWS.COM
(May
8,
2003),
the
Mysteries
of
Airline
Fares,
NBC
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3073548/ns/business-us_business/t/inside-mysteries-airline-fares/#.
UfvYjdK1FCg.
149. This has been the author’s experience purchasing tickets on the Delta.com website.
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consumers who prefer the certainty of a deal to one that can be
subsequently reordered. There is also a chance that sellers will try to
take unfair advantage of consumers who favor predictability over
surprises, and price the “plain vanilla” contract like retailers price
insurance for electronics—offering too little coverage for too much
money, 150 while hoping to take advantage of consumers’ cognitive
limitations. 151 Nonetheless, if consumers were offered two options, (1) a
cheaper “Darth Vader” deal, where the seller reserves the right to change
the terms, and (2) a more expensive contract that could not be changed
without something resembling a bargained-for exchange, the seller
would at least send a clear signal about the level of contractual
predictability offered to the purchaser of its product or service.
If one is concerned that forcing sellers to offer two deals takes away
too much necessary discretion, and is still persuaded that cost savings
realized through unilateral reordering could be passed down to
consumers, a second option—the “perceptible value” proposal—offers
the seller the opportunity to put its money where its clause is. In one
reported case, Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 152 a credit card
provider attempted to keep consumers from exercising the ability to opt
out of a new arbitration clause by promising a 2% cut in the interest rate
for those who agreed to binding arbitration. 153 The court reasonably
found the modification enforceable because consumers accepting the
modification were given an actual, perceptible benefit for doing so, and
consumers who did not accept the modification were allowed to keep
using the card in accordance with the old deal. 154 It is not unreasonable
to think that the card provider valued its savings under the arbitration
clause at something above the 2% cut. Neither is it irrational to think that
even consumers who valued the ability to sue a credit card company for
breach of contract might have been willing to trade it away in exchange
for a 2% rate cut.

150. Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, draft at 18.
151. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
152. 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
153. The terms of the credit card agreement stated that:
You may elect to reject these changes in terms by completing the attached postage paid
postcard and returning it to American General Financial Center postmarked no later than
March 1, 1997. If you reject these changes your Annual Percentage Rate(s) will be reinstated to
the current rate(s) disclosed on your enclosed billing statement, and there will be no arbitration
agreement in effect.
Id. at 1413.
154. Id. at 1417–18.
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Following the example in Stiles, a change made pursuant to a
unilateral reordering clause might be enforceable if the party making the
change—almost always the seller 155—gives something of value to the
party subject to the change. Unlike the two-price solution, 156 which
provides clarity ex ante to consumers regarding the value to the seller of
the right to unilaterally reorder the contract, the perceptible value
proposal would maintain some seller flexibility up front, but require
sellers to reify the assumption underlying standard economic defenses of
boilerplate that contracting efficiencies will trickle down to consumers.
Thus, for example, a unilateral change to Facebook’s privacy policy
might be enforceable under the perceptible value proposal if Facebook
users subject to the change were provided with free promotion of a post
or two. 157
The perceptible value proposal would not require sellers to pass all
savings on to consumers. In line with old notions of sufficient
consideration, something just north of a negligible benefit could
suffice. 158 But like the benefit offered in Stiles, the benefit conveyed
should be some form of cash or savings that lasts for the remainder of
the existing term of the contract. For example, it would not meet the goal
of the perceptible value proposal to conclude that consumers received
something of value from a seller who adds an arbitration clause to a
contract simply because the seller is bound to arbitration like
consumers. 159 In addition, the perceptible value proposal would not
necessarily require sellers to provide an opt-out to consumers, which is

155. But see Andrew Trotman, Man Who Created Own Credit Card Sues Bank for Not Sticking to
Terms, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personal
finance/borrowing/creditcards/10231556/Man-who-created-own-credit-card-sues-bank-for-notsticking-to-terms.html (reporting that a Russian court upheld new terms inserted by a consumer in a
credit card agreement when the bank signed the modified agreement, apparently without reading it).
156. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
157. The going rate to promote one of the author’s Facebook posts on September 13, 2013 was
$6.99, a price that is, for now, too rich for the author to pay. Facebook claims that promoting a post
“simply increases the likelihood that your audience will see your message in their News Feed.”
Promoted Posts, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/promote (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
How much promotion increases said likelihood has not been disclosed.
158. In fact, courts are unlikely to wade into the question of whether value conveyed by the seller
is commensurate with the change made. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441,
445 (N.Y. 1982) (“Far from consideration needing to be coextensive or even proportionate, the
value or measurability of the thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as it is acceptable to
the promisee.”).
159. But see In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2002) (holding a new arbitration
clause in an employment contract enforceable because “the promise to arbitrate would have been
binding and enforceable on both parties”).

12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1426

12/13/2013 2:14 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1395

of questionable value in any case. 160
CONCLUSION
The proposed prophylactic rule barring the enforceability of unilateral
reordering clauses in boilerplate contracts, 161 and the more limited twoprice and perceived value proposals, 162 would lead in the same
direction—toward something reminiscent of old requirements for
bargained-for exchange to support an enforceable contract
modification. 163 Some might find the proposals too strong, but at a
minimum, there is good reason to question whether standard economic
defenses of boilerplate are applicable to unilateral reordering clauses.
The public may be required to live with boilerplate, but perhaps they
should not be subject to the endless reordering of that boilerplate, like
some game of musical chairs that only the seller can win. As the reel
world catches up to modern reality, may there seldom be cause to say
about our contractual obligations, “this deal is getting worse all the
time.”

160. While the contract in Stiles also included an opt-out provision, the ability to opt out is hardly
the sine qua non of an enforceable modification in a contract of adhesion, particularly in light of the
difficulties presented by calculating lock-in effects. See supra notes 104–05, 121 and accompanying
text.
161. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 147–60 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part I.B.

